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Rule Under Apartheid and the Fledgling Democracy
in Post-Apartheid South Africa:
The Role of the Judiciary
Justice Tholakele H. Madala*
I. Introduction
Chairperson, Dean of the University of North Carolina School
of Law, eminent professors, distinguished guests and participants,
ladies and gentlemen. Let me start by apologising most profusely
for my inability to be with you on this great occasion. But I must
thank the organisers of the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation for having invited
me to participate in this auspicious symposium, Apartheid to
Democracy in South Africa. I trust that I shall be able to honour
another invitation on another day.
I wish to pay particular tribute to my old friend, Professor Ken
Broun, and to congratulate him for his sterling book, Black
Lawyers, White Courts,' the culmination of his many years of
association with the underprivileged black lawyers of South Africa
and his unwavering support of their cause. Ken Broun and James
Ferguson were among the first American attorneys from the
National Institute of Trial Advocacy to introduce and train black
lawyers in South Africa in the NITA method of trial advocacy in
1986 during Mr. Pitje's time.' Those were times of intense
domination by the regime and intense resistance by the oppressed
* Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Justice Madala matriculated
in 1956 at St. John's College in Umata. He took up law in 1972 at the University of Natal
(Pietermaritzburg). He took silk in 1993 and was elevated to the Bench in the Eastern
Cape in 1994 becoming the first black judge in the Eastern Cape and the fourth black
judge to be so appointed in South Africa.
S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH
1 (2000).
2 Godfrey Pitje was, in his time, a prominent lawyer and a protagonist of human
rights. He was a member of the Black Lawyers' Association who was committed to
resisting apartheid, racism, and injustice. For further discussion of Godfrey Pitje's life,
see BROUN, id. at 1-29.
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majority. At great risk to himself, Ken braved those difficult times
and travelled to South Africa to help his black brothers and sisters
in the law. Ken taught all over South Africa. Does he not deserve
huge applause? We are proud of you, Ken.
As I sat pondering over what I should say to this august
gathering, many thoughts hurtled through my mind as memory
after memory came to the forefront, each one demanding
expression. I finally settled on the judiciary's role during the
apartheid era and the ground it has covered under the new
democratic dispensation.
II. Apartheid: A Historical Background
John Attanasio,3 writing in the Southern Methodist University
Law Journal, made the observation that "South Africa has
achieved what few commentators thought was possible-a
peaceful revolution from an authoritarian, apartheid regime to an
egalitarian, democratic government. Fifteen years ago, few would
have dared to imagine such a peaceful revolution possible.
Predictions abounded of large-scale fighting and even civil war."'
Our history bears testimony to appalling abuses of human
rights. The law defined and enforced apartheid. Despite the
world's continuing censure, the state managed to sustain this
abhorrent regime through all of its arms. South Africa and the
international community have chronicled apartheid's practice and
effects. If inequality, authoritarianism, and repression pervaded the
past, the aspiration of the future is based on a society committed to
equality, freedom, and democracy-indeed, a new South Africa.
Under apartheid prior to 1994, we, as black South Africans,
had undergone fifty years of an oppressive system whose basic
characteristics were
disempowerment,
disenfranchisement,
repressive laws, and unprecedented violations of human rights
resulting in untold suffering for the great majority of our
population. Apartheid affected the black population socially,
politically, and economically. It was a complex set of practices
aimed at the domination and subjugation in differing degrees of
3 Dean and William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law, Southern
Methodist University School of Law.
4 John Attanasio, Foreword: Challenges, 52 SMU L. REv. 1523, 1523 (1999)
(citations omitted).
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the African, the Coloured, and the Indian.
Prior to the first democratic elections, the government granted

only small categories of African and so-called "Coloured" persons
the vote.By 1956, however, the government, through a series of

constitutional amendments, granted only whites the right to vote.6
By 1970, the elected Parliament had neither direct nor indirect
representation of African or Coloured South Africans.7 In effect

the majority of the country's citizens, African, Coloured, and
Indian persons, were not involved in the running of the country.
The legal system was engineered to cater to the white minority,
which made laws for itself and for others, with the latter having no
say in the system's development. This system enabled the minority
to follow a policy of white supremacy the legal system maintained
and enforced. To this end, the government introduced a plethora of

laws stifling political dissent

Under these laws, the State

5 See, e.g., § 35(1) of South African Act of 1909 (repealed 1983 & 1993)
(confirming limited grant of franchise to all male persons, regardless of race, who
possessed property valued at seventy-five pounds or who had earned not less than fifty
pounds during the previous twelve months and who could write down their name,
address, and occupation). The Act, which established the Union of South Africa in 1910,
entrenched the voting rights of some 20,000 African and Coloured voters in the Cape
Province, a number representing approximately fifteen percent of all parliamentary
voters in that region. ALBIE SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 164 (1973). A special
section of the Act provided that no one be removed from the voters' roll on account of
race with the exception that such action could be authorized by a law passed by twothirds of the House of Assembly and the Senate sitting together. Id. In 1936, African
voters were removed from the rolls by the requisite majority and were placed on a
special roll that entitled them to elect three white persons to the House of Assembly and
four white persons to the Senate. Id. The House and the Senate, at this time, had a total of
nearly two hundred members. Id. In 1956, Coloured voters were placed on a separate
voters' roll that entitled them to elect three white persons to the House of Assembly. Id.
This time the necessary two-thirds majority of the House and the Senate was obtained
after a long constitutional battle that culminated in the reconstitution and enlargement of
the Senate. Id. In 1959, African representation in Parliament was totally abolished; the
same fate befell Coloured persons in 1968. Id.
6 SACHS, supra note 5, at 164.

7

Id.

8 See, e.g., § l(l)(d) of Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (repealed

1991) (defining "communism" as any activity "which aims at the encouragement of
feelings of hostility between the European and non-European races of the Union");
§ 1(1 )(b) (defining "communism" as activity "which aims at bringing about any political,
industrial, social, or commercial change within the Union by the promotion of
disturbance or disorder"); The Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 (institutionalising
detention of political dissidents and defining broadly political crimes, such as subversion,
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President was given power to declare states of emergency and to
make regulations in the interest of public safety.' These regulations
included granting indemnity to members of the state and members
of the security forces for their conduct.'0 The states of emergency
permitted detention without trial of persons for periods from 90 to
180 days."
The apartheid regime indeed touched every aspect of lifeland ownership,' 2 education,'3 employment,' 4 freedom of speech

to include political activity).
9 See Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 (repealed 1995). This Act gave the State
President power to declare a state of emergency, which he did on numerous occasions
beginning in 1985. Id. Regulations promulgated under the Act provided for extensive
powers of arrest and detention without trial; they also substantially curbed the
dissemination of information about the state of unrest in South Africa. Id.; see, e.g., Proc
R109, in GG9877 of 12 June 1986.
10 Proc R121, in GG9877 of 21 July 1985.
1 § 17 of General Law Amendment 37 of 1963 (repealed 1982) (providing for a
ninety-day detention without trial). Section 17 was passed following an upsurge of
"terrorist" activities of Poqo, the militant wing of the banned Pan African Congress. Id.;
see also § 12B of Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (repealed 1991)
(providing for a 180-day detention period without trial where the detainee was a potential
state witness and not, as under the ninety-day detention period, an accused defendant); §
6 of Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 (repealed 1982 & 1996) (including provisions legalizing
indefinite detention without trial for interrogation purposes). But cf §§ 19(l)(a)bis, 1Osex
of Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (repealed 1991) (providing for
preventative detention).
2 See, e.g., Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 (repealed 1991); Native Trust and Land
Act 18 of 1936 (repealed 1991) (effectively making it impossible for members of the
African community, by far a racial majority in South Africa, to own land in some eightyseven percent of the country). The curtailment of the freedom to own property was
bolstered by other legislation, including the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian
Representation Act 28 of 1946, (repealed 1991), the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950
(repealed 1957), and the Black (Urban) Areas Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 (repealed
1986). Africans were initially referred to in statutes as "Natives." This term was later
changed to "Bantu," and eventually to "Blacks." The short titles of the statutes reflect the
name used to refer to Africans at the time the statute was promulgated.
'3 The system of Bantu education was initiated during the 1950s and enacted into
law by the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 (repealed 1979), the Indians Education Act
61 of 1965, 3 BSRSA pt. 8 (2000), the Coloured Persons Education Act 47 of 1963, 3
BSRSA pt. 8 (2000), and the Extension of University Education Act 45 of 1959
(repealed 1988).
"4 See, e.g., Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 (repealed 1945); Black (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 (repealed 1986); Bantu Labour Act 67 of 1964
(repealed 1984).
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and association,' 5 judicial administration, residence and
accommodation,' 6 and even marriage.' 7 The system had deleterious
effects on the black majority and on the minority groups of colour.
It imposed obligations and burdens on them, which, apart from
being discriminatory, were without any obvious justification. In
the period before the advent of the new democratic order, it is
common cause, in the words of my erstwhile brother, Chief Justice
Mahomed, that,
[flor decades South African history has been dominated by a
deep conflict between a minority that reserved for itself all
control over the political instruments of the state and a majority
who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights
became a major casualty of this conflict as laws designed to

15 See, e.g., § 15 of Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 (repealed 1991) (requiring
registration of all newspapers and, for those newspapers which the Minister of Law and
Order believes may be bannered pursuant to § 5, a large deposit); § 47(2) of Publications
Act 42 of 1974 (repealed 1996); § 29 of Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (repealed
1993). The infringement of these fundamental freedoms included restrictions on black
persons' ability to organise politically. See § 2 of Suppression of Communism Act 44 of
1950 (repealed 1991); § I of Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960 (repealed 1982)
(empowering the State President to outlaw organizations in the interest of the safety of
the public or the maintenance of public order), and § 4(1) of Internal Security Act 74 of
1982 (repealed 1996) (empowering the Minister of Law and Order to proscribe an
organization that, among other things, "engages in activities which endanger the security
of the State or the maintenance of law and order").
16 See, e.g., Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (repealed 1957) (restricting residence in
urban areas on the grounds of race); see also Proc R293, in GG66373 of 16 November
1962 in terms of the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927, 6 BSRSA pt. 28 (2000)
(making provision for the establishment of a special kind of township by the Minister of
Bantu Administration and development for African citizens in areas of land held by the
"South African Native Trust"). Even a cursory reading of the Proclamation conveys the
demeaning and racist nature of the system of which it was a part. Id. Provision was made
for the "Ethnic Character of [the] Population of Township[s]." Id. Limited forms of
tenure were created by way of "deeds of grant" and "certificate[s] of occupation of a
letting unit for residential purposes." Id. (emphasis added). The tenure was a precarious
one and could be cancelled by the township "manager" in the event, amongst others, of
the holder of the right "ceasing to be in the opinion of the manager a fit and proper
person to reside in the township." Id. There were also detailed provisions relating to
trading and other activities in the townships and to their control. Id. For further details,
see DVB Behuising, Ltd. v. N.W. Provincial Gov't & Another, 2000 (4) BCLR 347
(CC).
'7 See, e.g., Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 (repealed 1985)
(forbidding marriage between a European and non-European and providing that any such
marriage is void).
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counter the effectiveness of such resistance met the resistance of
those punished by their denial. The conflict deepened with the
increased sophistication of the economy, the rapid acceleration
of knowledge and education and the ever increasing hostility of
an international community steadily outraged by the
inconsistency which had become manifest between its own
articulated ideals after the Second World War and the official
practices which had become institutionalised in South Africa
through laws enacted to give them sanction and teeth by a
Parliament elected only by a privileged minority. The result was
a debilitating war of internal political dissension and
confrontation, massive expressions of labour militancy,
perennial student unrest, punishing international economic
isolation, widespread dislocation in crucial areas of national
endeavour, accelerated levels of armed conflict and a dangerous
combination of anxiety, frustration and anger among expanding
proportions of the populace. The legitimacy of law itself was
deeply wounded as the country hemorrhaged dangerously in the
face of this tragic conflict, which had begun to traumatise the
entire nation. 8
The rule of law was among the greatest and most serious
casualties of apartheid. The practice of the law and fundamental
human rights were on one side of the system. A decline in the
moral fibre of society and a collapse of social values were on the
other side. The system created a society in which the majority
came to regard the courts, judges, and the administration of justice
with suspicion and anger. In the eyes of the oppressed, the system
came to represent an enforcement of injustice and a denial of
protection. Society reached a stage where it was ready to defy and
disobey the law and, in fact, did so.
The judiciary, in general, was unable to resolve the impasse. It
did not have the option to review and reverse unjust laws; rather,
the courts and all the other institutions had to implement and
administer such laws. In the nature of things, because that power
had not been consented to or mandated by the great majority of the
people over which it was exercised, rule had to be by force; thus,
draconian laws and measures were unleashed on the people. The
government carried out forced removals of whole communities,
18

Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) & Others v. Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996

(4) SALR 671 (CC).
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detentions without trial, and solitary confinements. The
government used strict security measures and other practices to
make people disappear; many were killed in police custody.
Certain measures rendered the security forces, the police, and the
army unaccountable, to a large degree, to anyone. Consequently,
these groups were at large to commit atrocities on an
unprecedented scale.
I. Apartheid and Black South African Lawyers
Ken's book provides examples of how black legal practitioners
in South Africa struggled under the stranglehold of the apartheid
regime. The incident involving Lewis Skweyiya stands out in my
mind. Subsequent to a political trial in the Transkei, where his
clients were acquitted, two security policemen, who told him that
he was to be detained under the security laws, accosted him. He
was sure there had been some mistake, so he asked to phone the
chief of the Security Police. However, the official responsible for
his arrest had gone away for the weekend and could not be
reached. Skweyiya and his clients were taken away in a van
because the magistrate ordered their removal from the court and
their transportation to the South African border where they were
left, despite their acquittal. "My clients were feeling sorry for me.9
'Oh, we're sorry, we're so sorry.' That I also can't forget."'
Skweyiya was in detention for eleven days and was released
because of pressure from the bar council and other complaints. "I
was quite convinced that it was malicious detention. 2 ° That was
Skweyiya's only detention, but he was hounded incessantly with
threatening calls from anonymous individuals whom he suspected
were from the Security Police. The callers would say, "What has
happened to [Griffiths] Mxenge is going to happen to you., 2"
I often faced the same kind of harassment from the Security
Police. I use the case of the death of Sabata Dalindyebo, King of
the Tembus, to serve as an example. King Dalindyebo had died in
Zambia, and his body was brought back to the Transkei for burial.
The Dalindyebo family approached me to bring an urgent
application preventing the burial from taking place in the Transkei
19 BROUN, supra
20

Id.

21

Id.

note 2, at 138.
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because it meant laying the king to rest in ground not reserved for
royalty. The urgency of the application was such that we had
initiated proceedings at 12:00 a.m. and were intending to move the
application at 4:00 a.m. Therefore, in the early hours of the
morning, I had twenty-odd people in chambers. This group,
including Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and various members of
the Dalindyebo family, was instrumental in drafting the necessary
documents. Because there was a state of emergency in the
Transkei, we were all required to carry permits authorising us to be
in my chambers at that time. The Security Police stationed a van
outside the window and watched every move we made. They
harassed every person entering or leaving the building.
IV. The Judiciary's Role in the Apartheid Regime
The judiciary tended to shy away from commenting critically
on apartheid and its legal consequences in their judgments
although there were many opportunities for them to do so. Perhaps
they were not going to rock the boat; perhaps they considered it
inappropriate; perhaps they considered themselves bound to apply
the law as they found it. But on occasion, they went so far as to
sanction discrimination in their courthouses even in the absence of
laws compelling them to do so, as is demonstrated by an incident
involving Godfrey Pitje. While Pitje was serving as an article clerk
with Mandela & Tambo, Tambo gave Pitje a file concerning the
case of a Coloured man in Boksburg who was trading without a
license and had been arrested. Unbeknownst to Pitje, Tambo had
previously appeared for this man and had been asked to take a
segregated table and chair in the Boksburg magistrate's court. He
had declined. When the magistrate insisted, Tambo withdrew from
the matter, but not before asking for postponement so that the
accused could get himself another lawyer. That lawyer was to be
Pitje.
I got to Boksburg and the prosecutor, who didn't even have the
courtesy to look at me, told me that my case was.., being
handled by the senior public prosecutor, which surprised me.
This was really a minor case .... I moved from him towards the
door to go and find the senior public prosecutor. At the door, I
was accosted by a court interpreter who drew my attention to the
small table and chair at the door. In not so many words, he was
trying to say to me, "Please don't kick up any fuss. Go over to
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that table and let's finish with this case." I hardly had the time to
answer him, when the senior public prosecutor walked in,
oppressively, to take his position in the courtroom. At the same
time, the magistrate walked in and I moved from where I was to
the defence desk-to the regular defence desk, a long table
across the room. I positioned myself right in the middle of the
then said, "Get away from there." And I
table. The magistrate
22
"Why?,
said,
Pitje was summarily convicted of contempt by the magistrate and
was sentenced to a five pound fine or ten days imprisonment.23 He
went to the cells rather than pay the fine.24 The High Court, as well
as the Appellate Division, dismissed his appeal. In the latter case,
Chief Justice Steyn held that the order of the magistrate was a
competent one." He reasoned that
a magistrate ...is in control of his court-room and of the
proceedings therein. Matters incidental to such proceedings, if
they are not regulated by law, are largely within his discretion.
The only ground on which the exercise of that discretion and the
legal competence of the order might in this instance be called in
question, would be unreasonableness arising from alleged
inequality in the treatment of practitioners equally entitled to
practise in the magistrate's court .... But from the record it is
clear that a practitioner would in every way be as well seated at
the one table as at the other, and that he could not possibly have
been hampered in the slightest in the conduct of his case by
having to use a particular table. Although I accept that no action
was taken under the 1953 Act, the fact that such action could
have been taken is not entirely irrelevant. It shows that the
distinction drawn by the provision of separate tables in this
magistrate's court, is of a nature sanctioned by the Legislature,
and makes it more difficult to attack the validity of the
27
magistrate's order on the ground of unreasonableness.

22

BROUN, supra note 2, at 12.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 14.

Id. at 13-14 (quoting R. v Pitje, 1960 (4) SALR 709, 710 (A)). This case is
commented on in K. Govender & T.A. Woker, Race and Social Rights, in RACE AND THE
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 233 (A.J. Rycroft et al. eds., 1987). In Bangindawov. Head of the
27
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Judicial officers often regarded these apartheid laws and
practices as "normal law." Those who did regard the laws as
unacceptable did not consider it their place to comment on the
laws' character. The absence of compassion from these
judgements drew very clearly the disjuncture between justice and
humanity and the law and justice. Another example of this
disjuncture is a situation that happened to Justice Poswa, an
advocate of the High Court who was involved in a number of
significant human rights cases. 2' He was charged with contempt
while appearing in the Kimberly magistrate's court on behalf of
five persons charged with acts of terrorism. 29 About seven months
into the trial, during the cross-examination of a state witness, a
dispute arose between Poswa and the prosecutor." Justice Poswa
was convicted of contempt, amongst other things, for directly
addressing the prosecutor in the following terms: "The last thing
my learned friend is going to do here is to run my life. You don't
run my life, Mr. Prosecutor .... [W]ith respect I'm not going to let
my learned friend to come and make insinuations in this court."3
The charge was also upheld on the strength of the following
interchange:
Mr. Poswa: Any investigation done for me on my behalf by my
learned friend [the prosecutor] I would tear into
pieces....
Court:

Mr. Poswa, I am not interested in your trust in the
prosecutor or not and let us get this clear. I have
warned both counsel about it already before
(Intervention).
Mr. Poswa: You have not warned him, your worship, just now.
Court:
I have warned both, Mr. Poswa, and you will not
shout back at me. You are looking to be fined for
contempt of court. You are contemptuous the
whole morning every time I am speaking, Mr.
Nyanda Regional Authority, Justice Madlanga cited the case as an example of the
hardships-practical, emotional, and otherwise-brought about by the abhorrent
apartheid regime. 1998 (3) SALR 262, 268 (TK).
28 BROUN, supra note 2, at 175.
29

S. v. Poswa, 1986 (1) SALR 215 (NC).

30

Id.

31 Id. at 215-16.
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Poswa, and this is a final warning. 2
On appeal, the court confirmed the conviction on the basis that an
isolated incident would not justify summary action for contempt;
however, such an incident could justify such action when seen
against the background of previous similar incidents. Justice
Poswa articulated his perspective on the incident during his
interview before the Judicial Services Commission for
appointment to the Constitutional Court.33 When asked to respond
to the contention that he had ultimately been convicted because he
was "a person of temper,"" he responded:
[T]he case you are referring to, the magistrate concerned many
who subsequently sat before him for an hour or two or a day,
surprised that I did not end up in the lunatic asylum, because of
that individual ....[When] people in the Western Cape [were]

appearing before him he would say read S. v. Poswa. And you
must watch out. I ...survived that kind of case and finally, on
that the judgment in that case ...none of the acts quoted by

him, individually amounted to contempt of court.... I would
not have been convicted today of that case in view of the present
law on contempt of court.35
The systematic enforcement of racism through the law severely
impaired the dignity, freedom, and equality of the masses. The law
remained the main mechanism for the perpetration of human rights
violations. Almost all legislation was enforced through criminal
prosecution. Ironically, the effect of this type of enforcement was
to reduce the stigma that usually attaches to arrest and prosecution.
Cases were heard most often in the lower courts; those that did
reach the higher courts were treated without comment on the
unacceptable character of the law.
The South African judiciary accepted allegations of torture,
consisting of mental and physical abuse, with only muted protest.
The courts did little to protect the so-called offenders and
exercised no discretion when receiving the police and district
Id. at 218. The full exchange appears in the judgment of the court on appeal. Id.
at 215-19.
33 Interview with Justice Poswa, Constitutional Court of South Africa, at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/interviews/poswa.html (Oct. 5, 1994).
32

34 Id.

35 Id.
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surgeons' evidence. These hearings often took no account of the
accused's fundamental right to a fair trial. In addition, families
remained uninformed of the detentions and deaths of their loved
ones.
There were often situations in which criminalized conduct was
not entirely reprehensible when evaluated against democratic and
human rights standards. In such cases, it would have been possible
for judicial officers to express their repugnance for unfair laws in
their reasons for imposing criminal sanctions, on the grounds of
injustice resulting from racism or a denial of fundamental human
rights. In S. v. Thamaga," for instance, a black man convicted of
raping a young black girl was sentenced to four years
imprisonment. On the previous day, a black man convicted of
raping a young white girl was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment. Judge Hiemstra explained that the reason for the
disparity in sentences was not attributable to race but to the
differences in social standing between the rapists and the victims
and the fact that the white girl was a virgin. Indeed, it has been
widely argued that race played a factor in sentencing during
apartheid.37 At times, the judges' cultural biases were just as
apparent. In S. v. Mokonto,38 the court, in rejecting a self-defense
plea, held that the accused's belief in witchcraft could not be
regarded as reasonable in considering the unlawfulness of his
conduct. Judge of Appeal Holmes stated that the "common law of
South Africa in regard to murder and self-defence reflects the
thinking of Western civilisation ....To hold otherwise would be
to plunge the law backward into the Dark Ages."39
In 1997, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
invited judges to submit their statements on the role of the
36

1972 (2) PH, H143 (W).

37

See generally

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA: SELECTED ASPECTS OF
DISCRETION (Omesdahl et ai. eds., 1983); Van Oosten, Race as a Factorin South African

Criminal Justice, 32 CODICILLUS 21 (1991); John Dugard, Training Needs in Sentencing
in South Africa, S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 106 (1985); Barend Van Niekerk, The
Uncloistering of the Virtue, 95 S. AFR. L.J. 362 (1978); Harold Rudolph, Racial
Insensitivity and the AD, 4 S. AFR. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 66 (1980); Barend Van
Niekerk, Mentioning the Unmentionable: Race as a Factor in Sentencing, 3 S.AFR. J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 151 (1979).
38 1971 (2) SALR 319 (A).
39

Id. at 324.
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judiciary in contributing to the violation or protection of human
rights under the old regime." Inviting the judiciary to play this role
was necessary in light of the Commission's noble aims of
acknowledging oppression, understanding people's concerns,
improving judicial processes, and reconciling old adversaries. The
judiciary acknowledged these aims and felt that their submissions
would assist in building a responsive and competent system that
would protect human rights in the future. The judiciary's
submissions dealt with the law's role in giving effect to apartheid,
stifling political dissent, and fostering institutional racism within
the legal system. Their testimony also shared the creative legal
strategies that organisations and individuals opposed to apartheid
used to thwart the system.
Although it is true that some members of the judiciary did their
best in a bad system to protect human rights, it was a humbling
experience for the members of the judiciary to give their
testimonies to the TRC. Many members are in fact great jurists
and adjudicators, a fact borne out by their work and contributions
in other areas of law not directly involving apartheid and human
rights. It is my fervent wish that the existing bench and that of the
future will be enhanced and developed through proactive
involvement in human rights developments on a global scale.
Today, the chroniclers of reality have reported voluminously
on the judiciary's violations of very basic human rights. Many feel
that judges had the power to render the indefinite periods of
detention nugatory by refusing to accept as creditworthy any
evidence procured during such periods of detention. Others have
responded more drastically and have suggested that judges who
felt the moral injustice of apartheid ought to have resigned. The
realistic view is that isolated resignations would have made little
or no impact on the system. It was better that the few members of
the bench who were sensitive to objectionable state conduct
remained as a source of some hope to the accused.
Before the 1994 elections and the advent of a new democratic
order, the effective protection of human rights through the courts
was virtually impossible in South Africa. Under the cloak of
Parliamentary sovereignty, there was no constitutional machinery
40 DAVID
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to check the dictatorial, arbitrary, and draconian legislation passed
by a Parliament which itself, seemingly, was above the law. In that
time, when those few members of the bench affected by the
prevailing conditions dared to make any comment, they did so
with the greatest diplomacy and tact. Their words are still
inspirational today. I quote my erstwhile brother, the late Justice
Didcott, who served on the Constitutional Court's bench. In 1979,
he said:' "Parliament has the power to pass the statutes it likes,
and there is nothing the courts can do about that. The result is law.
But that is not always the same as justice. The only way that
Parliament can ever make legislation just is by making just
legislation." 2
Thus, at the end of the apartheid era, it became important that
some credible body be vested with the power to blow the whistle
when the parameters of a constitutional covenant were
transgressed. Without such power that covenant would have no
teeth. The body armed with such power could not be the alleged
transgressor itself. It could not be the state agency accused of the
transgression. In a credible democracy such an agency could only
be the judiciary. The judiciary alone would have the final power to
decide whether the impugned enactment or provision had
transgressed the constitutional guarantee.
V. The Emergence of Democracy
With the demise of apartheid, a democratic order with all the
attributes that clothe human beings with dignity emerged. One can
therefore understand the euphoria that ushered in the interim and
final constitutions, which, among other unique features, made
special provision for a Bill of Rights.
On February 4, 1997, the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa came into force, 3 proclaiming itself as our nation's highest
law. 44 In the Preamble 45 and the founding provisions, 46 we
41
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In re Dube, 1979 (3) SALR 820 (N).
Id. at 821 n.35.

S. AFR. CONST. (1996).
Id. ch. I, § 2. The supremacy of the Constitution was retained from section 4 of
the interim Constitution. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 4 (1993).
45 S. AFR. CONST. pmbl. (1996).
46 Id. ch. 1.
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committed ourselves to healing the divisions of the past, to
establishing a society based on democratic values, to restoring
human dignity and social justice, and to advancing fundamental
human rights.
That, after all, was what the struggle was all about. The
majority of South African citizens had always sought and desired
to enter South African institutional life as free and equal citizens.
They had always clamoured for enfranchisement. They had sought
and pleaded for equality before the law and for equal protection
under the law. They had sought and clamoured to participate
equally in South Africa's free enterprise system. They had sought
to enjoy equally with other citizens freedom of expression,
association, movement, and residence, as well as other freedoms.
Above all, they had sought equal opportunity.
The task facing South Africa's evolving judiciary is
challenging
and
difficult,
both
constitutionally
and
jurisprudentially. The judiciary's charge in our new constitutional
democracy is not only to monitor the conduct of the legislature and
the executive, but, most importantly, to guard against the violation
of human rights. The manner in which judges and practitioners
discharge this responsibility will have important and far-reaching
implications for the transformation process and for the type of
society we will have in the future. The Constitution exhorts the
judiciary to bring all aspects of our law in line with our new
constitutional values, and it gives the judiciary extensive powers to
do so." This allows the courts unusual latitude within which to
develop the law.
The interim and final constitutions created several independent
mechanisms. One of these, the Judicial Services Commission, was
specifically established to protect the independence of the
judiciary.48 The Constitution's drafters recognised that the
judiciary had to be kept independent if the rule of law was to be
paramount in South Africa. 9 The principle of parliamentary
sovereignty was based on the theory that the legislative function is
ultimately determined by the will of the people in a majoritarian
47
48

Id. ch. II, § 39, ch. VIII, § 165-72.
Id. ch. VIII, § 178.
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democracy. The judiciary had been constrained by that principle,
but now the extent of that constraint is being debated. Judges on
the benches of the High Courts of South Africa are especially
aware of the need to nurture and encourage a universal respect for
the rule of law. To curb the escalating violence in the country and
the response of vigilantism, lawmakers and lawgivers need to
ensure that paths of law and justice run sufficiently close together
to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Only an independent
and impartial judiciary can achieve these goals.
It can also be accepted that on a substantial number of
occasions, judges ought to have, and could have, adopted statutory
interpretations that would have favoured the protection of
fundamental rights. ° Dugard"' concluded that positivism played
too strong a role in the application of the law in South Africa. 2
Legal scholars and judges too readily accepted the legitimacy of a
law without first critically analysing it.
The final Constitution makes an emphatic distinction between
the various arms of government. By its express direction, both the
Constitutional Court and the High Courts have the power to decide
on the constitutional validity of any parliamentary or provincial
bill.53 Decisions by the High Court on the validity of acts are,
however, subject to confirmation by the Constitutional Court."
Therefore, the South African Parliament no longer has the ultimate
say on the validity of laws passed by it. This power of judicial
review is an invaluable tool in the promotion of human rights and
the protection of human norms.
In the period before the constitutional democracy, the Minister
of Justice appointed judges on the recommendation of the Chief
Justice or of the judge-president of the relevant division. The
selection process was a confidential one, thus allowing for the
handpicking of candidates whose beliefs were sympathetic, or at
50 Compare Minister of Law & Order v. Hurley, 1986 (3) SALR 568 (A), where the
then Appellate Division reinterpreted a clause which was previously interpreted to oust
the jurisdiction of the courts to inquire into the lawfulness of the conduct of officials in
terms of a regulation.
5' See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER
(1978).
52 Id.

11 S. AFR. CONST. ch. VIII, § 172 (1996).
54 Id. ch. VIII, § 172(2).
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least not overtly opposed to the government of the day. The
protection of human rights became the victim of the selection
process.
The candidates were drawn primarily from the ranks of senior
counsel. Prior to the 1990s, South African judges were
predominantly white males. 5 Among their ranks were two white
female judges.56 Prior to that time no black judges were selected,
although African magistrates were occasionally found in the rural
areas and homelands. These magistrates had little influence on the
legal culture and the administration of justice. This imbalance was
perpetuated by the denial of amenities and education to Africans.
As a result, there were very few African persons in the law
schools, the legal profession, and the bar from which the bench
was drawn. In addition, the study of law was almost exclusively
reserved for the white male minority. Apart from strict quota
systems based on ethnicity, the law schools and seats of learning
were the preserve of the relatively wealthy. The small number of
African lawyers exacerbated the problem of the lack of legal
representation for the large number of accused blacks passing
through the legal system on a daily basis. As argued previously, it
was not uncommon for the accused black to be treated in a racist
fashion. 7
The Judicial Services Commission has acknowledged the dire
need for a bench that represents a cross-section of South African
society. The demographic composition of the bench does not
presently represent such a cross-section, and it is a problem that
we need to address with a sense of urgency if the judicial system is
to attain legitimacy. The courts cannot remain aloof from the
pursuit of national goals; indeed, it is their duty to promote those
ideals that constitute the cornerstone of the Constitution.
-5 D.D. Mokgatle, The Exclusion of Blacks from the South African JudicialSystem,
3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 44, 45-46 (1987).
56 As of January 1994, the two female judges were Justice L. van den Heever and

Justice H.M. Traverso.
-7 This undermines the legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the people, including
those who were victims of the unjust legal systems of the past. Acknowledging this
factor is a prerequisite for the discharge of the present and future responsibilities to
achieve constitutional goals of democracy, human dignity, freedom, and equality. When
that imbalance is corrected, the role of the judiciary in promoting and protecting human
rights will be significant.
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Under the final Constitution, the appointment process is both
transparent and independent. In keeping with the oath taken by all
members of the judiciary, judges have pledged to obey, observe,
uphold, and maintain the Constitution and all other laws of the
Republic. Judges are further bound by a solemn promise to always
devote themselves to the well-being of the republic and its entire
people. 8 Under the new dispensation, although the President
confirms the appointment of judges, this is done only via a
consultative process between the Judicial Services Commission
and the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly.59
Section 1 of the final Constitution provides as follows:
The republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state
founded on the following values:
(1) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms.
(2) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(3) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(4) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll,
regular elections and a multiparty system of democratic
government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and
openness.
The advancement of human rights is a core value upon which
sovereign South Africa is founded. The Constitution's drafters
relied heavily on standard international human rights documents,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' the
European Convention of Human Rights,6" the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights," and the American Convention on
58
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§ 174(8), sched. 2 (1996).

59 Id. ch. VIII, § 174.
60 Id. ch. 1,§ I.
61

G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810

(1948).
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (1968).
63 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
64 Organization of African Unity: Banzul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
Jan. 7, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59.
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Human Rights.65 The interim Constitution went further than the
standard international documents: it included the rights to
demonstrate and present petitions,66 the right to a healthy
environment," and the right of access to education," including
instruction in the language of one's choice.69
Not all the rights in the Bill of Rights are absolute. They are
subject to a general limitations clause." The Constitutional Court
has adopted a two-stage analysis in determining whether or not a
protected right has been violated.7' The first stage involves
interpreting the right by exploring its substantive content." If a
violation is found, the court moves on to the limitation enquiry."
In examining any limitations of fundamental rights, the court is
obliged to ensure that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality,
and freedom." When adjudicating on matters involving human
rights, the courts are also obliged to give regard to international
human rights law and comparative foreign case law.75 It might well
be that today's South African bench so zealously protects and
promotes human rights as a reaction to the apartheid regime. I like
to believe, however, that the vigour of the judiciary in South
Africa is only a tiny constituent of the hopes and beliefs of my
brothers and sisters on an ever-shrinking globe.
As a further means of promoting and protecting human rights,
the final Constitution contains a rather unusual provision which
allows direct access to the Constitutional Court in cases where the
ordinary procedures do not help litigants and where adjudication
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American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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S. AFR, CONST. ch. III, § 16 (1993).
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Id. ch. 111, § 29.

68

Id. ch. III, § 32.

69

Id.

70

S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 36 (1996).

1' S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 435 (CC).
See S. v. Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR 642, 654 (CC); S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1)
(1996).
73 See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 654.
74 S. AFR. CONST. § 36(1) (1996).
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of the issues is of pressing urgency and public importance. 6 The
rationale for this rule's creation is not limited to expediency.
Rather, the rule was created so that access to justice is not denied
as it was in the past where ordinary people could not reach the
courts because they were too remote and too costly. Already in the
first two years of its existence, a quarter of the cases the
Constitutional Court decided involved issues of direct access."
The very first direct access case before the Constitutional
Court"8 involved the validity of a section of the South African
Criminal Procedure Act that dealt with confessions.79 The Court
granted the litigants direct access because the interests of justice
demanded that a binding decision on the validity of the particular
section be given urgently." The Court has refused direct access,
however, where there is no pressing need for a definite and final
decision on a constitutional issue.' The Court has also stated that it
will only decide cases referred to it if the issues in a case are
dispositive to the case. 2 The Court will not decide a case in the
abstract where the constitutional issues are peripheral. 3
The bench's attitude in interpreting the Bill of Rights can best
be summed up by the words of my brother, Justice Albie Sachs. 4
He said, "[W]e should not engage in purely formal or academic
analysis, nor simply restrict ourselves to ad hoc technicism, but
rather focus on what has been called the synergetic relation
between the values underlying the guarantees of fundamental
rights and the circumstances of the particular case."85 The Court
76

Id. § 167(6)(a), (b).

77 E.g., Bessegerlik v. Minister of Trade, Indus., & Tourism, 1996 (4) SALR 33
(CC); Brink v. Kitshoff NO, 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC); Exec. Council, W. Cape Leg. v.
Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1995 (4) SALR 977 (CC); Ferreira v. Levin NO, 1996 (1)
SALR 984 (CC); S. v. Mbatha, 1996 (2) SALR 464 (CC); Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 642.
78 Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 642.

79 Id. at 646; § 217(1)(b)(ii) of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, 5 BSRSA pt. 26
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80 Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 646.
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has thus far been very cautious as it walks the tightrope between
social, political, and economic realities and an overly idealistic
application of the Bill of Rights. Its caution can be seen in those
decisions where it has declined to make a ruling on punitive
damages,86 and where it has struck down an impugned section by
suspending an order of invalidity for a stipulated period to enable
the legislature to remedy that provision. 7 In the Ntuli case, where
,the legislature failed, for lack of resources, to carry out the order of
the Court within the time period allowed, the Court rapped the
legislature on the knuckles by refusing to extend the time period.8
The Court has deliberately employed a generous approach to
the interpretation of the Constitution. It hails its Constitution as a
dynamic and living instrument and refuses to interpret it in a
narrow and legalistic way, especially where such an interpretation
would deny persons the benefits of the Bill of Rights. 9 We do not
lose sight of the role of our history in the interpretive process.
Justice O'Regan stated in Brink v. Kitshoff NO:"°
Our history is of particular relevance to the concept of equality.
The policy of apartheid, in law and in fact, systematically
discriminated against black people in all aspects of social
life.... The deep scars of this appalling programme are still
visible in our society. It is in the light of that history and the
enduring legacy that it bequeathed that the equality clause needs
to be interpreted. 9'
86 Fose v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 1997 (3) SALR 786 (CC) (declining to hold
that punitive damages in claim of assault by South African police are "appropriate" relief
under § 7(4)(a) of the South African Constitution).
87 E.g., S. Afr. Ass'n of Pers. Injury Lawyers v. Heath & Others, CCT 27/2000 of
28 Nov. 2000 (as yet unreported); Metcash Trading Ltd. v. Comm'r for the S. Afr. Rev.
Serv. & Another, CCT 3/2000 of 24 Nov. 2000 (as yet unreported); S. v. Ntuli, 1996 (1)
SALR 1207 (CC) (declaring § 309(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act an
unconstitutional restriction on right of convicted defendants to appeal).
88 Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR at 1217.
89 S. v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867 (CC) (ordering that a South African
constitutional provision denying application of the Constitution to matters pending
before its promulgation was not to be interpreted as precluding criminal defendant's
constitutional rights). In Mhlungu, the Court found that a literal interpretation of the
provision "would deny a substantial group of people the equal protection of fundamental
rights ....
Id. at 884.
90 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC).

91 Id. at
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Our interpretive process is shaped by our history but not limited by
it. It is a response to our past and to our future and a process that
we envision will grow and mature to meet the challenges of an
evolving South Africa, and indeed, an evolving world.
The Judicial Services Commission recognises the need for
orientation programmes to assist judges to avoid race and gender
stereotypes, which can lead to injustices. The Commission also
encourages both local and international discourse between.
members of the bench. These orientation and continuing education
programmes are being established for both judges and magistrates
to assist them in the role they will play in the new constitutional
order and in promoting human rights norms. Those concerned with
the preservation of the law are continually contributing to its
development by bringing new ideas to bear on old problems.
Chief Justice Mohamed, in his welcoming address to the
Eleventh Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association
Triennial Conference in Cape Town, described at least six areas
that jurists need to identify and effectively debate. The areas
identified by my learned brother are crucial for all societies
wishing to foster and develop a culture of human rights, and they
are especially apt for developing countries throughout the world.
They may be summed up as follows: (1) demystifying the
substance of the law, language, and processes of judicial
adjudication; (2) ensuring that the tribunals of justice are
accessible and user-friendly to the common citizen; (3) creating
efficiency in the delivery of justice-a review of the formalities
and procedures which impede or unnecessarily clog a court's
capacity; (4) facilitating access to transnational jurisprudential
insight and cross-pollination of ideas; (5) fostering of a symbiotic
relationship between law and justice, which is crucial to the
legitimacy of the law (this would entail jealous protection of
judicial independence in the pursuit of the objectives against all
illegitimate invasions); and in my opinion, most importantly, (6)
developing, through active debate and interaction between all
levels of society and government, an ethos of constitutional justice
and a vibrant legal culture that is moulded within the psyche of the
people and within the soul of the nation.
The judicial community in South Africa has already taken its
first steps towards realising these goals. Many of the members of
the bench wondered whether they would falter under the
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responsibility of their role as purveyors, protectors, and promoters
of the ideals espoused in the Constitution. Happily, they have
borne this charge with a sense of honour and commitment that
bodes well for the active promotion and protection of human
rights.

